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GREATER PROVIDENCE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE V. STATE:
BALANCING PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS IN FILLED TIDAL
LANDS UNDER THE RHODE ISLAND PUBLIC TRUST DocTRINE
JOHN M. BOEHNERT*
I. INTRODUCTION
Unlike many other states that have grappled with the public trust
doctrine in recent years, such as Massachusetts, Vermont, California, New
Jersey, and Mississippi,' the public trust doctrine in Rhode Island was largely
a nineteenth century doctrine until the Rhode Island Supreme Court's
decision in Hall v. Nascimento.2 In Hall, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
considered a previously undecided question under Rhode Island public trust
doctrine, namely, who owns title to land created by the placing of fill below
mean high tide.3 Under Rhode Island's public trust doctrine law, the state
owns all land below mean high tide in trust for citizens of the state for the
purposes of fishery, commerce, and navigation,4 but Rhode Island courts had
not addressed directly the ownership of land reclaimed from the sea by
placing fill below mean high tide until Hall v. Nascimento.
Many individuals in Rhode Island state government and certain public
interest groups asserted that, under the Rhode Island Supreme Court's
Partner, Partridge, Snow & Hahn, Providence, Rhode Island. B.S., 1974 Boston
University; J.D., 1979 Georgetown. Mr. Boehnert has authored numerous articles for trade
journals on environmental and business law issues. He was counsel for plaintiffs in Greater
Providence Chamber of Commerce v. State, 657 A.2d 1038 (R.I. 1995).
' See generally Philips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988); State v. Central
Vt. Ry., 571 A.2d 1128 (Vt. 1989); National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709
(Cal. 1983); Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 393 N.E.2d 356 (Mass.
1979); Matthews v. Bayhead Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984).
2 See Hall v. Nascimento, 594 A.2d 874 (R.I. 1991) (holding that land created by placing
fill in Mount Hope Bay belonged to the state, and not to an association of property owners
nor to the owners of a beachfront residence claiming title).
See id.
See Nugent ex rel. Collins v. Vallone, 161 A.2d 802, 805 (R.I. 1960).
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decision in Hall, the state owned title to all filled tidal land throughout the
state.5 Because Rhode Islanders have been reclaiming land from the sea since
the early eighteenth century, this claim potentially affected thousands of
parcels throughout the state, including land in much of downtown
Providence's financial district, land along tidal rivers, such as the Providence
River, and land along the coast occupied by businesses, residences, summer
cottages, and marinas.6
The General Assembly considered legislation dealing with the issue,
but given opposition to the proposed solution, which potentially involved
property "owners" leasing back their land from the state, the General
Assembly did not enact legislation in the 1992 session.7 With the issues still
unresolved in 1994, a number of businesses and institutions in Rhode Island
filed a declaratory judgment action against the State of Rhode Island, seeking
clarification of the status of filled tidal lands.' In Greater Providence
Chamber of Commerce v. State,9 the Supreme Court of Rhode Island held
that title to two parcels of real estate located in the former Great Salt Cove in
See Greater Providence Chamber of Commerce v. State, 657 A.2d 1038, 1043 (R.I.
1995).
6 See generally Committee to Mark Out and Define the Boundaries of the Harbor of the
Town of Providence, Town Meeting 1, July 24, 1815, with supplemental material, Aug. 24,
1815 (discussing the general extent of filling in Providence as of 1815); Providence Steam-
Engine Co. v. Providence & Stonington S.S. Co., 12 R.I. 348, 363-64 (1879) (Potter, J.,
concurring) (discussing general filling and wharfing in Rhode Island from its early history);
Clarke v. City of Providence, 15 A. 763 (R.I. 1888) (discussing filling of the downtown
Providence cove lands); Murphy v. Bullock, 37 A. 348 (R.I. 1897) (discussing filling of the
downtown Providence cove lands); City of Providence v. Comstock, 65 A. 307, 308-09 (R.I.
1906) (quoting ANGELL, TREATISE ON TIDE WATERS (2d ed. 1847)); Rhode Island Historical
Society, RHODE ISLAND HISTORY, Aug. 1990 (containing articles based on talks delivered
at lecture series entitled "Harboring History: The Providence Waterfront", cosponsored by
the Rhode Island Historical Society and the Providence Preservation Society in 1988); JOHN
HUTCHINS CADY, THECIVICANDARCHITECTURALDEVELOPMENTOFPROVIDENCE 1636-1950
(The Book Shop, Providence, R.I. 1957) (containing maps of areas in Providence that
formerly were covered by tidal water and are now platted as streets).
' See Robert C. Frederiksen, Sundlun, Assembly Democrat File Separate Shore-Access
Bills, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Feb. 19, 1992 at 5.
' See Greater Providence Chamber of Commerce v. State, 657 A.2d 1038 (R.I. 1995).
9 Id.
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downtown Providence was free of the public trust doctrine by virtue of an
1870 deed from the State of Rhode Island to the City of Providence, which
effectively extinguished the public trust doctrine in the properties.' 0 The
court also held that two properties created by the placing of fill to a harbor
line in the Providence River, and extensively improved, were free of the
public trust doctrine, and fee simple absolute title vested in the private record
title holders. " In rendering its decision, the court also established a test for
clearing title to filled tidal land throughout the state that was filled with state
acquiescence or approval, and that has been built upon or improved in
reliance on such authorization. 2
In reaching its decision, the Rhode Island Supreme Court did not
reject, but rather embraced, the public trust doctrine in Rhode Island. 3 This
article contends that the court's decision in Greater Providence Chamber of
Commerce v. State is consistent with well over 100 years of past court
decisions on the public trust doctrine. Furthermore, the court's decision
carefully and appropriately balanced private property rights in filled tidal land
with the public's rights under the public trust doctrine to land located below
mean high tide. This article also asserts that the court's careful balancing of
private property owners riparian " rights with the public trust rights of the
public at large serves as a model for how other states may reconcile public
trust rights with private property rights in developed former tidal lands. The
apportionment of these rights has been a source of conflict in a number of
states in recent years and no doubt will continue to be the subject of
considerable controversy.
'0 See generally id.
' See id. at 1041.
12 See id. at 1044.
See id. at 1043.
4 This article uses the terms "riparian" and "littoral" interchangeably, as has been the
Rhode Island Supreme Court's custom in its public trust cases.)
1997] 639
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II. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE UNDER RHODE ISLAND LAW
The public trust doctrine as developed under Rhode Island law holds
that the state owns title to all land below the high water mark in a proprietary
capacity for the benefit of the public, to preserve the public rights of fishery,
commerce, and navigation in such waters. 5 Rhode Island cases addressing
the public trust doctrine deal with tidal waters (i.e., waters subject to the ebb
and flow of the tide), and Rhode Island courts have never held that nontidal
waters are subject to the public trust doctrine. 6 Moreover, under Rhode
Island law, not all tidal waters are subject to the public trust doctrine:
marshlands are not burdened by the public trust doctrine, even though they
are subject to tidal influence. 7
The doctrine was a part of English common law, to. which Rhode
Island and the other original colonies acceded upon their independence. 8
States subsequently admitted to the Union after adoption of the Constitution
had the same rights as the original states in tide waters and the lands under
them within their jurisdiction.' 9 Such common law is in force in Rhode
"5 See Nugent ex rel. Collins v. Vallone, 161 A.2d 802, 805 (R.I. 1960); City of
Providence v. Comstock, 65 A. 307 (R.I. 1906); New York, N.H. & H.R. Co. v. Horgan, 56
A. 179, 180-81 (R.I. 1903).
16 There is no specific case reference holding that only tidal waters are subject to the
public trust doctrine. This observation is based on the cases and other materials cited in this
article.
'7 See Providence Steam-Engine Co. v. Providence & Stonington S.S. Co., 12 R.I. 348,
357 (1879) (Potter, J., concurring).
1S At common law, the title and the dominion in lands flowed by the tide
were in the King for the benefit of the nation. Upon the settlement of the
Colonies, like rights passed to the grantees in the royal charters, in trust for
the communities to be established. Upon the American Revolution, these
rights, charged with a like trust, were vested in the original States within
their respective borders, subject to the rights surrendered by the
Constitution to the United States.
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894); see also New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 56 A. at
180-81.
"q See Shively, 152 U.S. at 57.
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Island "except as it has been changed by local legislation or custom."2
The common law of England upon this subject, at the
time of the emigration of our ancestors, is the law of this
country, except so far as it has been modified by the charters,
constitutions, statutes or usages of the several Colonies and
States, or by the Constitution and laws of the United States.2
English common law recognized that the Crown exercised ownership
and jurisdiction over tidal water in a proprietary capacity for the benefit of the
public.22 The Crown possessed the jus privatum, or private title, in such
lands, as well as the jus publicum, or public title.23 The Crown held the
public title to such public trust lands as representative of the nation and for
the public benefit.24
In essence, English public trust jurisprudence recognized the unique
resource that tidal waters constitute and the necessity that the sovereign hold
them in a trustee capacity for the use and benefit of all citizens, so as not to
be appropriated by, or conferred upon, private individuals for purely private
benefit.25 This principle underpins the public trust doctrine in Rhode Island
and the other states.
Although the original thirteen colonies, and subsequent states,
succeeded to the interest of the Crown in the tidal waters within their
jurisdiction, no uniform public trust doctrine is applicable throughout all the
26states. 6 Rather, public trust jurisprudence is peculiarly a doctrine of state
law. As the United States Supreme Court noted in the seminal public trust
case of Shively v. Bowlby:
20 Comstock, 65 A. at 308 (adopting lower court decision).
2 Shively, 152 U.S. at 14.
22 See id.
23 See id. at .11.
14 See id.
25 See id.
26 See id. at 26.
1997]
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The foregoing summary of the laws of the original States
shows that there is no universal and uniform law upon the
subject; but that each State has dealt with the lands under the
tide waters within its borders according to its own views of
justice and policy, reserving its own control over such lands,
or granting rights therein to individuals or corporations,
whether owners of the adjoining upland or not, as it
considered for the best interests of the public. Great caution,
therefore, is necessary in applying precedents in one State to
cases arising in another.27
III. HISTORY OF FILLING TIDAL LANDS IN RHODE ISLAND
It is common knowledge in Rhode Island that a significant part of the
state's land has been reclaimed from the sea, beginning in the early 1700s
when Rhode Island was still a colony. The Colonial General Assembly
resolved in Newport on May 28, 1707 as follows:
Be it enacted by the Honorable Governor and council
and house of representatives convened in General Assembly,
and by the authority of the same it is enacted, that each town
in this colony now established, or that may hereafter be
established, may be, and have hereby granted unto them full
power and authority to settle such coves, creeks, rivers,
waters, banks bordering upon their respective townships, as
they shall think fit for the promotion of their several towns
and townships, by building houses, and warehouses, wharfs,
laying out lots, or any other improvements, &c., as the body
of freeholders and freemen of each town shall see cause for,
or the major part of them, for their most benefit, not
27 Id. (emphasis added); see also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 475
(1988) ("[lI]t has been long established that the individual States have the authority to define
the limits of the lands held in public trust and to recognize private rights in such lands as they
see fit.").
[Vol. 21:637
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prejudicing any particular person in their proper original
grants or purchases upon any the aforesaid harbors, coves,
creeks, &c., which we doubt not but will much promote the
interest of Her Majesty, and the good of her good subjects in
said colony, for the promoting of trade and navigation.2"
After statehood, the colonists of Rhode Island undertook filling of
various coastal and tidal areas for establishing wharfs, docks and landings;
laying out residential house lots; and constructing commercial buildings.29
In many instances there was no filling and upland owners would "wharf out"
from their property, establishing wharfs on piles located below mean high
tide.3" Frequently, buildings were constructed on these wharfs.3
The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed that the 1707 Resolution
granted Rhode Island's colonial government full authority to regulate the use
and improvement of such filled lands, including the right to grant such lands
to private individuals.32 In City of Providence v. Comstock, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court acknowledged the extensive filling that had occurred in
Rhode Island, and focused on the various city approvals and resolutions
authorizing such filling.33
In Armour & Co. v. City of Newport,34 the Rhode Island Supreme
Court reviewed the 1707 resolution and held that the Colonial Act of 1707
"granted no title to land," but rather "conferred upon the various towns the
28 4 RHODE ISLAND COLONIAL RECORDS 23, 24 (John Russel Bartlett ed., 1859).
" See generally Dawson v. Broome, 53 A. 151 (R.I. 1902); Brown v. Goddard, 13 R.I. 76
(1880); Providence Steam-engine Co. v. Providence & Stonington S.S. Co., 12 R.I. 348
(1879); Bailey v. Burges, II R.I. 330 (1876); Simmons v. Mumford, 2 R.I. 172 (1852);
Gerald H. Krausse, Metamorphosis of the Providence Waterfront: A Geographic
Perspective, R.I. HIST., Nov. 1990 at 102; Michael Holleran, Filling the Providence Cove:
Image in the Evolution of Urban Form, R.I. HIST., Aug 1990 at 66.
30 See CADY, supra note 6, at 106, 120, 178 (unnumbered photographs).
See id.
32 See City of Providence v. Comstock, 65 A. 307, 308 (R.I. 1906); New York, N.H. &
H.R. Co. v. Horgan, 56 A. 179, 180-81 (R.I. 1903).
" See Comstock, 65 A. at 309-13.
'' Armour & Co. v. City of Newport, 110 A. 645 (R.I. 1920).
1997]
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authority to settle and improve such lands by 'laying out lots,' 'by building
houses, and warehouses, wharfs,' etc., and the authority to authorize such
improvements to be made by others."" The court further stated that under
the Resolution of 1707 a town "was by implication authorized to convey,
subject to the title being defeated in [the] event the improvements were not
made; but until improvements were made, or, at least, until some action was
taken by the town, no title passed. 36
Accordingly, as early as 1707 in Rhode Island's history, the
authorization of wharfing and filling of coastal areas, rivers, and other
waterways for the purpose of settlement was established." Given this
authorization, it is not surprising that the Rhode Island colonists engaged in
such activity, which continued after Rhode Island's entry into the Union and
well into the 19th century.
The result is that today significant parts of downtown Providence are
located on filled tidal land, including the 67-acre Capitol Center Special
Development District, significant portions of the downtown financial district,
areas of India Point, much of the land between Allens Avenue and the
Providence River, areas between Eddy Street and the Providence River, and
areas fronting on portions of numerous streets, including Friendship Street,
Dyer Street, Orange Street, Point Street, and Clifford Street."
Such filling was not confined to Providence, but occurred along
Rhode Island's entire coastline as it was settled, including on Aquidneck
Island, particularly in Newport.39 Much of the significant filling of tidal land
which occurred in Rhode Island's past was performed by upland owners
adjacent to their individual properties. Most of this activity was done on an
11 Id. at 647.
36 Id.
17 See 4 RHODE ISLAND COLONIAL RECORDS, supra note 28, at 23-25.
"8 See Tidal Trauma, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Apr. 17, 1992, at 14; Holleran, supra note 29,
at 66-68; Krausse, supra note 29, at 102; CADY, supra note 6, at 164 (unnumbered
photograph).
3' See generally Providence Steam-Engine Co. v. Providence & Stonington S.S. Co., 12
R.I. at 363 (1879); New York, N.H. & H.R. Co. v. Horgan, 56 A. 179 (R.I. 1903).
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individual, rather than a wholesale, basis.4"
IV. THE EFFECT OF FILLING TIDAL LANDS UNDER RHODE ISLAND LAW
A. Title to Lands Filled to a Harbor Line or the Equivalent of a Harbor Line
Prior to Hall v. Nascimento,t perhaps the two Rhode Island Supreme
Court decisions most frequently cited in seeking to understand the ownership
status of filled tidal lands in Rhode Island were Allen v. Allen 42 and Engs v.
Peckham.43
In Allen, the court was confronted with a trespass action in which the
upland owner asserted trespass against another for the digging of clams
adjacent to his property below the high water mark." The court held that the
fee of the shore (i.e., the land below high water mark) is in the state as trustee
for the public, that the upland owner's riparian rights between high and low
water mark are in the nature of franchises or easements, and that any Rhode
Island inhabitant may take shellfish from anywhere on the shore of
Narragansett Bay below high water mark without being guilty of trespass.45
In its decision, the court summarized its understanding, as of 1895,
regarding the right of a riparian upland owner to fill land below mean high
tide or to wharf out into the bay, and the legal effect of such activity as
follows:
The State holds the legal fee of all lands below high-water
mark, as at common law, as has been uniformly and
repeatedly decided by this court .... This right of the state is
held, however, by virtue of its sovereignty, and in trust for all
40 This conclusion is drawn generally from language in the cases cited in this article, which
refer to the right of riparian owners wharfing or filling out from their property.
41 Hall v. Nascimento, 594 A.2d 874 (R.I. 1991).
42 Allen v.: Allen, 32 A. 166 (R.I. 1895).
"' Engsv. Peckham, 11 R.I. 210(1875).
44 See Allen, 32 A. at 166.
41 See id. at 166-67.
1997]
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the inhabitants,-not as a private proprietor. The public
rights secured by this trust are the rights of passage, of
navigation, and of fishery, and these rights extend, even in
Massachusetts, to all land below high-water mark, unless it
has been so used, built upon, or occupied as to prevent the
passage of boats, and the natural ebb and flow of the tide.
The establishment of a harbor line permits the riparian owner
to carry the upland or high-water mark out a certain distance
from the natural shore. Actual extension of the upland to the
new line extinguishes all public rights within it. The land
which was formerly shore becomes upland, and, while the
rights to shore and upland are not changed, they are carried
further out into the tidal stream or sea. Until actual filling
out, the public rights exist as before.46
The court's statement in Allen is a clear and unequivocal declaration
that public trust rights are extinguished in land reclaimed from the sea upon
filling, but only as to the reclaimed land. Public trust rights continue in force
below the new high water mark created by filling.47 The court recognized in
Allen that when land is reclaimed from the sea, a new high water mark is
established, and the court concluded from this reality that it is below the new
high water mark that the public trust rights continue to exist, not below the
former high water mark.48
Those who seek to extend public trust jurisdiction over such filled
tidal lands dismiss the court's clear declaration in Allen as dicta. Because
there is no evidence in the court's decision to indicate that the property in
question was formerly filled tidal land, it would appear that the court's
statements in Allen are in fact dicta. Nevertheless, as will be discussed
below, their status as dicta does not mean they are incorrect statements, or
that these statements are unsupported by other Rhode Island Supreme Court
decisions.
46 Id. at 166 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
47 See id.
48 See id. at 167.
[Vol. 21:637
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The Rhode Island Supreme Court engaged in a more extensive
discussion of the relationship of the public trust doctrine to filled tidal lands
in Engs v. Peckham.49 In Engs, two private individuals owned adjoining
wharfs projecting into Newport Harbor.50 Between the two wharfs was open
water, utilized as a dock.5 When a harbor line was established for Newport
Harbor, the owner of the upland facing the open water dock began to extend
his upland by filling, thereby filling in the dock and making it unusable for
the other wharf owner." The disadvantaged wharf owner sought an
injunction, which was denied by the Rhode Island Supreme Court."
In its opinion, the court acknowledged that each party was the
"owner" of his respective wharf, and that if the dock was filled in, the
complainant's wharf would be "valueless. 5 4 However, despite the fact that
the filling of the dock would render complainant's wharf valueless, the court
refused to enjoin the filling, some of which already had occurred, and it
refused to order removal of the partially-filled area within the dock.5 The
court determined that although the dock constituted public waters of the state,
which the complainant had a right to use without any grant, the use did not
give the complainant wharf owner any right in these unfilled public waters.5 6
4' Engs v. Peckham, 11 R.I. 210, 221 (1875).
'0 See id.
"' See id.; a dock is the open water adjacent to a pier or bulkhead where a ship or boat may
park.
52 See id. at 221-23.
" See id. at 221, 225.
5" See id. at 222.
s See id. at 225.
See id. at 222-23. The court then explained the impact of the establishment of a harbor
line on the upland owner's right to fill out into the dock:
At common law the erection of a wharf in tide waters is not
indictable as a nuisance unless it obstructs navigation. In this
state this doctrine has been liberally applied for the benefit of
riparian proprietors. Such proprietors have been very freely
permitted to erect wharves, and even to make new land by filling
the flats in front of their land. We are not aware that the state
has ever laid claim to any wharf so built, or any land so made,
unless the cove lands filled by the city of Providence can be
1997]
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In referring to an unreported decision, which counsel for the
respondents in Engs asserted stood for the proposition that the establishment
of a harbor line was a conveyance to the upland owner of all land between
high water mark and the harbor line, the court said:
We think, however, it would be going too far to hold
that the mere establishment of a harbor line conveys
all within the line absolutely to the riparian
proprietors. This would make all within the line
private property, and extinguish the public rights of
navigation and fishery. We think the establishment of
a harbor line, if it is to be construed as a conveyance,
is to be construed as a conveyance which at least is
subject to those rights, until they are excluded by
filling or wharfing out. But it is not necessary for us
to go even so far as that in the case at bar. It is
enough for the respondents if we hold that the
establishment of a harbor line operates as a license or
invitation to the riparian proprietor to fill or wharf out
to that line. We think it has at least such an effect.
Whether the riparian proprietor, who has filled or
wharfed out, has as against the state the same absolute
considered an exception. Our harbor line acts are to be
construed in the light of this doctrine and practice. The
establishment of a harbor line, when so construed, means that
riparian proprietors within the line are at liberty to fill and extend
their land out to the line. A harbor line is in fact what it purports
to be, the line of a harbor. It marks the boundary of a certain part
of the public waters which is reserved for a harbor. The part so
reserved is to be protected from encroachments. The rest is to be
left to be filled and occupied by the riparian proprietors. Its
establishment is equivalent to a legislative declaration that
navigation will not be straitened or obstructed by any such filling
out.
Id. at 223-24 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 21:637648
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dominion over the wharf and new-made land as over
his upland, is a question which we need not now
determine.17
The court therefore clearly stated its judgment (in dicta) that
filling below mean high tide extinguished the public trust rights in
such land, though it reserved that decision because it was not
necessary to resolution of the issue presented.58 Again, those who
urge public trust jurisdiction over such filled land also dismiss this
language as dicta.
To understand the significance of the court's statements in
Allen and Engs, Rhode Island Supreme Court decisions prior and
subsequent to these cases must be examined carefully. This
examination reveals that the dicta in Allen and Engs were entirely
consistent with both prior and subsequent decisions and statements
of the Supreme Court. The decisions of the court, when read
together, establish a clear, consistent, and cogent position that in
Rhode Island, by custom and usage authorized by legislative acts,
Rhode Island citizens extended the title to their upland property by
filling out below mean high tide, and in doing so extinguished the
public trust rights in these filled tidal lands.
For example, it was common in the early history of Rhode
Island to plat land for lots and streets, even though at the time of the
platting the land was flowed by tide water.59 Purchasers would buy
these submerged lots and reclaim them by filling.' Such platted land
was at issue in Simmons v. Mumford.6' Although the City Council
had approved the plat at issue in that case, it had deferred final
" Id. at 224-25 (emphasis added).
58 See id.
5 See generally Dawson v. Broome, 53 A. 151 (R.I. 1902); Providence Steam-Engine Co.
v. Providence & Stonington S.S. Co., 12 R.I. 348 (1879); Bailey v. Burges, 1 R.I. 330
(1876).
o See Simmons v. Mumford, 2 R.I. 172 (1852).
61 See id.
1997]
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acceptance of the streets until the streets were shown to be passable
(i.e., until they were reclaimed by filling).62 Thirty years later, after
such streets had been filled, the Board of Aldermen attempted to
accept such streets on behalf of the City.63 The court held that the
Board of Aldermen did not have this authority. 64 The court then
turned its attention to the dispute between two landowners on either
side of the platted street. One of the landowners sought to extend his
property line to the middle of the platted street, excluding passage by
erection of a fence.65 The other property owner contended that the
entire forty-foot way had to be kept open as a street.' The court
never questioned that the plaintiff and defendant were in fact
"owners" of their respective lots, formerly submerged land, and found
that both lot owners owned the street abutting their property as
"tenants in common."67 The court found that because the platted
street was not dedicated as a public way, there was no evidence in the
record to prevent the plaintiff from claiming ownership to the middle
of the platted street.68 Additionally, the court did not induce the other
party to refrain from occupying any portion of the street adjacent to
his boundary line.69 Accordingly, the court recognized private title to
submerged tidal lands.7"
In 1870, the Rhode Island Supreme Court decided another
case involving tidal lands, and the facts reinforced the prevalent
custom and usage in Rhode Island of filling tidal lands and of
wharfing out into the harbor.7 In Clark v. Peckham, a private
individual brought an action against the City of Providence for
62 See id. at 175-76.
61 See id. at 176.
6 See id. at 182.
65 See id. at 178.
66 See id.
17 See id. at 187.
tS See id. at 186.
69 See id. at 190.
'0 See id.
71 See Clark v. Peckham, 9 R.I. 455 (1870), aff'd, 10 R.I. 35 (1871).
650 [Vol. 21:637
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alleged harm to a private wharf caused by filling from city sewer
runoff that occurred in the dock adjacent to the wharf.72 The
Dorrance Street Wharf was a part of the "Dorrance Street Estate,"
which the Dorrance Street Association had formed by agreement and
which consisted of land, stores, wharfs, docks, and other
improvements." Title to lots was held individually and title to certain
common areas, such as open spaces on the side of each of the thirteen
lots, was held by the lot owners as tenants in common.74
In discussing the property rights of filled tidal lands, the court
noted:
The plaintiff derived his title to the dock and
wharf from certain parties known as the Dorrance
street [sic] Association, who after the establishment of
a harbor line for the city of Providence, filled up land
formerly flowed by tide water, and entered into an
agreement respecting this dock and wharf and the
adjacent premises ......
The Dorrance Street Association agreement is laced throughout with
grants of fee simple title in the filled lands, none of which was noted
or objected to by the court.76
The court stated that title to the dock was in the state, and
action could not be maintained for filling it and the Dorrance Street
Association could not convey title to the open water.77 The court
noted, however, that "[t]he agreement of the association provided for
a division, and the deeds convey simply the land, real estate not
flowed by the sea, conveying with it whatever may be properly
72 See id. at 456.
71 See id. at 457.
74 See id. at,458-59, 469.
Id. at 457.
71 See id. at 457-61.
17 See id. at 471.
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appurtenant."78 The court therefore clearly recognized the right of
conveying private title in filled tidal lands.79 Accordingly, the court
recognized that while an action could not be maintained merely for
filling a dock, an action could be maintained for harm done to the
Dorrance Street wharf as a result of the filling.8°
In 1871, the Rhode Island Supreme Court again considered
Clark v. Peckham after remand for a new trial.8' At the new trial, the
trial court instructed the jury that, if the City did not own the land
adjoining the dock, the City did not have the authority to fill up the
dock with discharges from its sewer system.8" Again, the trial court
found for the plaintiff, with damages against the City.83 On appeal,
the Supreme Court found that the plaintiff had pursued its riparian
rights and built wharfs out to the harbor line.84 The court held that
because the City did not have title to the upland bordering the dock,
it could not fill out with deposits from the sewer pipe, and the
plaintiff was entitled to any damages it may have incurred by reason
of such filling.85
Importantly, in its decision the court again recognized (in
dicta) that public trust rights are extinguished upon the filling of tidal
water by the upland owner. 86 "So long as the dock is not filled by the
owner of the bank, it is subject to thejus publicum of being used for
passage by the whole public."87 Consequently, it is apparent that in
the Rhode Island Supreme Court's view, the jus publicum, or the
public's rights under the public trust doctrine, were extinguished
upon filling by the upland owner.
7 Id. at 471.
See id.
'0 See id. at 471-72.
8' Clark v. Peckham, 10 R.I. 35 (1871).
82 See id. at 37.
8 See id. at 39.
84 See id. at 37.
8 See id. at 38-39.
86 See id. at 38.
87 Id.
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In another case involving the subdivision of house lots below
the high water mark, a trustee asked the Rhode Island Supreme Court
to give instructions as to the impact of the establishment of a harbor
line on these submerged lots.88 In that case, the platted lots were
sought to be sold for reinvestment. 89 The trustee sought instructions
because of doubts concerning the ownership of the submerged land
between the high water line, which was the westerly line of the lots,
and the newly established harbor line, whether or not it formed part
of the trust estate.' The harbor line apparently was established after
the lots were platted.9' In advising the trustee, the court said:
It is true the riparian proprietor may fill out in front of
his land, but, if he does so, he fills out by the
permission or acquiescence of the state,-the
establishment of a harbor line being at the least
equivalent to such a permission expressly given...
The fact that the lots are defined by strict boundary
lines is of no consequence; for, if the grantee fills out
in front of them, he will do so not under the deed, but
by virtue of his riparian ownership, and he will take
the land so filled not from Tristam Burges or his heirs
or devisees, but from the state.92
Accordingly, the court instructed the trustee that in selling for
reinvestment he should not sell any lot bordering upon the high water
mark "for a price below what he would sell it for, upon the
supposition that the purchaser will be at liberty to fill out to the
harbor line any part of such lot which extends to or below high
" See Bailey v. Burges, 11 R.I. 330 (1876).
89 See id.
90 See id. at 331.
9' See id.
2 Id. at 331-32 (emphasis added).
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water-mark. 9 3 The court further instructed the trustee that "if he
cannot procure purchasers upon such terms, to sell only upland lots,
until he has further orders or instructions from the court.
94
The court therefore treated the purchaser's title from the seller
as equivalent to title taken from the State by virtue of filling out."
The court expressed no reservation to the trustee that the purchasers
buying lots abutting high water mark might not be entitled to extend
their lots to the harbor line, or that if they did so they would not own
such reclaimed land. Rather, the court instructed the trustee to sell
for a price based upon the right of the purchaser to acquire title to the
land reclaimed up to the harbor line.96
The Supreme Court also determined the specific manner in
which upland owners have the right to fill out to a harbor line in a
dispute between two adjoining upland owners.97 In Aborn v. Smith,
both owners already had partially filled out to a harbor line.9" The
land fronted on the Providence River, with one owner's boundary
being relatively straight, and the other's boundary being curved,
giving the owner of the irregular parcel a greater length of shoreline. 99
The owner with a longer shoreline sought a declaration from the court
that its boundary at the harbor line, to which it intended to fill out,
should be the same length as its upland boundary."° The court
recognized that to allow such a rule would necessitate changing the
boundary lines of other upland owners all along the same harbor line:
[U]nder the rule contended for, the proprietor of the elbow in
the shore, having a long shore line, will be entitled to a long
frontage which will swing the dividing line between him and
9' id. at 332.
94 id.
9' See id. at 331-32.
See id. at 332.
See Aborn v. Smith, 12 R.I. 370 (1879).
9' See id. at 370.
9 See id.
'0o See id. at 371.
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the next proprietor aslant, and the result will be a
corresponding obliquity on all the water fronts and dividing
lines above it.''
The court held that filling out to a harbor line should be directly out
from the upland property owner's boundaries so as to intersect the
harbor line at a right angle.' °2 "It would be impracticable now, after
so many fronts have been filled, to allow it to affect the
apportionment along the whole harbor line, even if originally it would
have been right and expedient. ' 3
Significantly, the Aborn court declined to give effect to a
decision that would alter previously established property boundaries,
demonstrating appropriate deference to the settled expectations of
property owners.
The nature and extent of riparian rights in filled tidal lands
was discussed extensively in Providence Steam-Engine Co. v.
Providence & Stonington Steamship Co.'o4 The case involved land
that was platted into lots in India Point, where a street extended from
below the then-high water line to the newly-established harbor line.' 5
The dispute arose when the owner who had purchased all lots fronting
on a platted street closed the street after it was filled.0 6 Another
property owner in the plat objected, and the owner closing the street
argued that platting a street below mean high tide water was invalid
and, alternatively, that as a sole owner of lots on the platted street he
was entitled to close the street. 107
The court found that the street could not be closed by the lot
owner because the street was a right appurtenant to all lots in the
1l Id.
102 See id. at 372-73.
103 Id. at 372.
'o See Providence Steam-Engine Co. v. Providence & Stonington S.S. Co., 12 R.I. 348
(1879).
OS See id. at 353.
06 See id. at 348.
10' See id. at 349.
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plat.'0° The court placed little reliance on the new harbor line act,
finding that it "amounts simply to a license to him to fill out to the
harbor line, or to an implied declaration that in filling out to it he will
commit no encroachment. ' °9 However, the court found that a street
platted below tide water came into existence when it was filled, and
owners of the platted lots were estopped from denying the use and
designation of the land in question as a street. 110
This decision was important to Justice Potter's concurring
opinion."' In addressing the argument that "platting and conveyance
of lots and of any rights in any supposed streets was totally invalid as
to that portion of the platted land then under water," Justice Potter
examined common law." 12 He noted that English common law, which
subjected all land flowed by tide to the public trust, had been
modified by Rhode Island to exempt marshes." 3 He then discussed
the English common law doctrine underlying public trust principals,
and noted that it is common "to speak of the right of the State in the
shores as a fee," with the shores being defined as the area between
high and low water mark. 14 He stated that "[t]his is proper only by
analogy,""' 5 and explained that to consider the state as the literal
owner of the shore in fee effectively could eliminate upland owners
riparian rights:
To hold that the State holds the fee of the shore in
such a sense that it can sell the shores would deprive
nearly half of the land in this small State of a large
portion of its value derived from bounding on the
shore. The city of Newport is the owner of Easton's
0 See id. at 356.
IO Id. at 355.
''o See id.
. See id. at 356.
112 Id.
.. See id. at 357.
114 Id. at 357-58.
"I Id. at 358.
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Beach. For the State to sell the shore would take
away almost its whole value.
As there is no statute of limitations against the
State, especially so far as public rights are concerned,
the State would still own large tracts of filled lands in
Providence, Newport, and other towns, unless the
State has done some act which would justify the
courts in holding it to be private. And even if the
private title to land so filled should be held good, the
State might still sell out a strip of land at the head of
any wharf and so cut off the owner from navigation.
It might sell off the whole shore so as to cut off the
present owners from access to the water.
The monstrous injustice that would result if
such a doctrine was established as law is enough to
show that it ought not to be recognized as law." 6
Justice Potter then asserted that it is for this reason that the
state holds title to the shore not as private property, but as property
held for the benefit of the public." 7 Justice Potter clearly was
concerned by the concept that an upland owner's riparian rights could
be extinguished by the state's sale of shore land for private
purposes."' As Justice Potter concluded after discussing English
common law and decisions of other states:
The language of many of the decisions can be
reconciled by holding that while the State does not
own the shore in fee, properly speaking, and therefore
cannot sell the shore to be held as private property,
and so cut off the riparian owner from the water, it has
the complete regulation and control of it for public
116 Id. at 358-59.
' See id.
IS See id. at 361.
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purposes. 9
Justice Potter then noted that some states have held that there
can be no private riparian rights in tide flowed land, but these
decisions largely involve railroad cases, and they "have been made in
States peculiarly situated as to railroad corporations.""' Justice
Potter then discussed cases that have criticized cutting off a riparian
proprietor from access to navigable water.'
Continuing his analysis of the strong riparian rights
recognized by Rhode Island courts, custom, and usage, Justice Potter
said:
In this State it has always been understood that
the riparian owner has the right to wharf or embank
against his land, and so make land from tide-water,
and this without license, provided he does not
interfere with the navigation . . . . In very few
instances was there any legislating by the State, and
notwithstanding the common practice of wharfing and
filling, it is believed there has never been an instance
of the State interfering to prevent it. There has,
indeed, been a good deal of legislation regulating the
Long Wharf in Newport.
Up to 1815, we had no Harbor Line Act, and
for a large portion of the shore have none now. But
no Rhode Islander ever thought he was obliged to
petition the General Assembly for leave to build a
wharf on his own land, and the records of our General
119 Id.
120 Id.
2 See id. at 361-62.
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Assembly and courts will, we think, be searched in
vain for any attempt to interfere with this privilege so
generally used.
From the very first settlement of the State, our
people have claimed and held property in tide-waters.
And the fact that from the first settlement of
the State, down to 1815, no act was ever passed even
to limit and restrain this ancient practice, is
significant. The Harbor Line Act of 1815 does not
profess to grant any rights, but only to prevent
encroachments by wharves beyond the established
line ....
The right to wharf out or reclaim is a valuable
right even before its exercise. It constitutes a part of
the value and sometimes nearly the whole value of the
upland. 22
Justice Potter continued his lengthy discussion of riparian
rights by discussing the laws of various other states, English common
law, and Scottish law.'23 He noted "[t]hat where land is reclaimed
from the tide-waters it may be held, at least to a certain extent, as
private property, cannot well be doubted."' 24  Justice Potter's
concurring opinion is a strong statement of riparian property rights,
which included the right to fill out below the high water mark and to
acquire title by so doing.'25
Justice Potter previously had cited Bell v. Gough, noting that
"some of the judges expressed very strongly the view I have here
22 Id. at 363-64.
23 See id. at 365-69.
124 Id. at 369 (citing Bell v. Gough, 23 N.J.L. 624 (1852)).
"3 See id. at 363.
1997]
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
taken as to the riparian right to wharf out and occupy, and that it was
a sort of a customary law there."'1
26
In Bell, the court held that where a riparian owner makes
improvement on the shore or reclaims the shore adjoining his land,
the part of the shore reclaimed or improved belongs to the upland
owner and cannot be granted by the state. 2 ' In that case, the facts
limited the holding to filled land between the high water mark and the
low water mark. 2 '
A report by the City of Providence Committee responsible for
recommending the 1815 Harbor Line in Providence is noted in Justice
Potter's concurring opinion, and is very important to understanding
the custom in Rhode Island of upland owners acquiring title to land
reclaimed from the sea. 29  The committee's report noted
encroachments on the Providence River by upland owners, stating
that "our united opinion is that the original rights of Individuals have
been extended beyond the original intention of the proprietors when
the lots were first laid out as appears by Plats defining the bounds of
the channel .. ..,,130 The report noted that "our citizens have been
permitted by the Town thus to extend their claims over the waters,"
and then went on to recommend a harbor line, which was adopted at
the town meeting, and which would allow for more filling out to the
harbor line.' 3' Interestingly, it was adopted despite concern voiced at
the town meeting that there had been too much encroachment on the
harbor:
,2t Id. at 362.
127 See Bell v. Gough, 23 N.J.L. at 685, 688-89.
.2 See id. at 625.
"2' See Providence Steam-Engine Co. v. Providence & Stonington S.S. Co., 12 R.I. at 363-
64.
30 Committee to Mark Out and Define the Boundaries of the Harbor of the Town of
Providence, Town Meeting 1, July 24, 1815, with supplemental material, August 24, 1815.
"3' See id. at 1, 6-7.
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And this meeting taking into consideration the said
report after an elaborate discussion of its merits
though with the conviction and under a Sense, that the
said Harbor, to which the Town is indebted in a great
measure for its rank and importance has been too
much contracted for its future interests, misfortune the
more to be deplored as it seems almost without
remedy. '32
Thus, although the town thought there had been too much
private encroachment on the harbor, the town also felt that it could
not undo such encroachment, presumably because the property so
filled was seen to be owned by the upland landowner. This was noted
by Justice Potter in his concurring opinion in Providence
Steam-Engine, as follows:
The State never undertook to regulate this right [i.e.,
wharfing and filling into the harbor] till 1815, and
then did not profess to grant a right, but only to
prevent encroachment to save the harbor; and it is
noticeable here that the business was first taken up in
town meeting, and a committee of five of the most
respectable citizens appointed, men old enough to be
well acquainted with the usages of our ancestors and
the shore rights claimed by them, and who died before
most of the present members of the bar were born.
And this committee reported that in their opinion "the
rights of individuals have been extended beyond the
original intention of the proprietors when the lots
were first laid out, as appears by plats," &c. And the
town proceeded to vote in town meeting that the plat
reported by the committee be "established as
2 Id. at 4.
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containing the boundary lines of the harbor aforesaid,"
and for greater security that application be made to the
General Assembly.'33
Thus, Justice Potter recognized what the "men old enough to
be well acquainted with the usages of our ancestors and the shore
rights claimed by them" had recognized, and what the town meeting
of 1815 had recognized: In Rhode Island filling out was a valuable
property right of riparian owners, and when they reclaimed such
property it became theirs.'34 If filling was too extensive, the remedy
was to regulate further filling, not to dispossess the upland owners of
their reclaimed land.13
5
In still another case involving disputed boundaries of filled
tidal land among adjoining private landowners, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court affirmed that a grantor can convey his inchoate right
to fill out below high water mark to a harbor line. 36 In settling the
boundary dispute, the court found that the lots which were conveyed
were "lots extending indefinitely out into the river between parallel
lines forty feet apart."'137 The court noted that such grants could not
pass title to the submerged lands, because such title was in the state,
but went on to say that,
the grantor, though he had no actual title, and
accordingly could convey none, yet had a sort of
inchoate or potential title by virtue of his right to fill
out under leave of the state, and this, under deeds
purporting to convey the lots as platted, would enure
to the benefit of the grantees ....
'3 Providence Steam-Engine Co., 12 R.I. at 363.
134 See id.
" See id.
136 See Brown v. Goddard, 13 R.I. 76, 81-82 (1880).
131 Id. at 81.
138 Id.
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The court noted that such grants "were all subject to an implied
contract or assurance on his part, that his grantees should have not
only the upland, but also whatever right or privilege he himself had
to fill it out, and incorporate with it the tide-flowed flats and river bed
as platted .. .
In Gerhard v. Seekonk River Bridge Commissioners,40 the
court reaffirmed the ownership of soil under tide water when it found
that a lessee of tidelands who had been dispossessed by the erection
of an embankment supporting a bridge was not entitled to claim
damages.' 4'
In 1888 the Rhode Island Supreme Court expressly addressed
extinguishment of public trust rights in tidal lands by filling the
land. 42 In Clarke v. City of Providence, the court clearly stated that
public rights could be extinguished by filling, as to a harbor line, even
if such filling was not made for public trust purposes. 43
This dispute involved the tidal basin in downtown Providence,
in the former cove lands.'" The land, then a public park, had been
reclaimed by filling the cove, and in 1870 had been conveyed by the
state to the city. 45 In 1888, the General Assembly passed legislation
authorizing the City of Providence to discontinue use of the land as
a public park and fill the cove basin, creating channels through it for
the Woonasquatucket and Moshassuck Rivers and allowing the land
to be sold for railroad or other purposes. 146 Certain Providence
residents sought to enjoin the filling on several grounds. '47 One of the
grounds asserted was that because the area in question formerly had
"' Id. at 82.
140 Gerhard v. Seekonk River Bridge Comm'rs, 5 A. 199 (R.I. 1886).
'4' See id.
'4 See Clarke v. City of Providence, 15 A. 763 (R.I. 1888).
,4' See id. at 765-67.
144 See id. at 763-64.
141 See id.
46 See id. at 764; 1888 R.I. Pub. Laws 722.
141 See Clarke, 15 A. at 764.
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been covered by tide water, the General Assembly could not authorize
the filling of the land which would extinguish the constitutional right
accorded citizens to "enjoy and freely exercise all the rights of fishery
and privileges of the shore to which the people of the State have been
heretofore entitled under the charter and usages of the State," and that
the act of the General Assembly authorizing the filling was in conflict
with the Rhode Island Constitution, Article I, Section 17. 48
In its analysis, the court noted that the constitutional provision
"leaves the rights of the people as they existed previously to the
,,149Constitution... [and] neither diminishes nor adds to them ....
Accordingly, the court inquired into the rights and privileges of the
people "under the charter and usages of this State before the
Constitution was adopted, in order to decide whether they are
infringed by the act of the General Assembly."'' 0  The court then
stated:
It is common knowledge that the citizens of the State
have always been accustomed to dig clams freely
along the shores of the bay and river wherever they
could be found, and, subject to some legislative
regulations, to fish in the deeper waters; and because
this has been so, and because formerly citizens were
accustomed to clam and fish in the cove, the
complainants take it for granted that they are entitled,
under section 17, to clam and fish there in the same
manner forever, and that therefore any act of the
General Assembly which authorizes the filling, or
partial filling of the cove, thus lessening their ability
to do so, must be unconstitutional and void. But it is
also common knowledge that there are many places
where fish and clams were formerly taken which are
148 See id. at 765.
149 Id.
ISo Id. (emphasis added).
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now solid land made by filling out the shores, either
with the tacit acquiescence or with the implied or
express consent of the General Assembly. The acts of
the General Assembly establishing, or authorizing the
establishing, of harbor lines, some of which existed
before the Constitution, Digest of 1822, pp. 484, 485,
go to show that the assumption of the complainants is
too broad, and that these rights of clamming and
fishing are enjoyed in subordination to the paramount
authority of the General Assembly to regulate and
modify, and, to some extent at least, to extinguish
them. The counsel for the complainants, in view of
these acts, concedes that the General Assembly has
power to authorize encroachments upon the
tide-waters, where they are made in the interests of
navigation, for the erection of wharves, or are
effected for other public purposes. But there is
nothing in the acts, so far as we are aware, imposing
any such limit, and it is well known, as a matter of
fact, that no such limit has been observed. Moreover,
in the case at bar, the evidence introduced by the
complainants, while it shows that citizens did many
years ago fish and clam in the cove, does not show
that any such fisheries now exist there, and,
considering the extensive changes which are shown to
have been made, it is inferable that such fisheries, if
they have not wholly ceased to exist, have at least
ceased to have any substantial value, and, indeed,
some of the affidavits imply as much; so that, really,
the second ground on which the injunction is asked
does not rest so much on any existing fact as on a fact
which it is supposed the court will treat as existing,
because it formerly existed. We are not satisfied that
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the second ground is tenable either in law or fact.' 5 '
Clarke v. City of Providence is a strong statement that public
rights in filled tidal land may be extinguished, not just by an express
grant of the General Assembly, but also by "tacit acquiescence or
with the implied or express consent of the General Assembly," such
as the harbor line statutes, including the 1815 Providence harbor line
legislation. 5 ' Moreover, the court rejected the contention that
encroachments on tide water and the extinguishment of public rights
in filled tidal lands are limited to activities done in the interest of
navigation, the erection of wharfs, or activities otherwise effected for
public purposes. 53
The court also acknowledged that rights change as reality
changes.'54 Where lands have been filled, built upon, or improved as
to be impractical or unusable for public purposes, the rights to such
public purposes are extinguished.'55
The court reinforced a riparian owner's right to fill in Prior v.
Comstock.156 The Rhode Island Supreme Court expressly held that
where the upland has been extended by filling below mean high tide,
and there is no evidence that any other party filled under a claim of
ownership, the law assumes that such filling was done by the title
holder's predecessors in title under claim of ownership.'5 "Although
it is not shown that the riparian owners, predecessors in title to the
plaintiff, did any filling, nevertheless, in the absence of evidence that
it was done by any other party under a claim of ownership, such
filling inures to the benefit of the riparian owner."'58




See id. at 766-67.
'6 Prior v. Comstock, 19 A. 1079 (R.I. 1889).
117 See id.
... Id. at 1079.
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In Carr v. Carpenter,'59 which dealt with the rights of taking
seaweed stranded on the beach, the court reviewed a number of prior
cases involving seaweed and privileges of the shore.' 60 The court
quotes with approval its earlier decision in Engs v. Peckham161
regarding the strong tradition of riparian property rights recognized
by the Rhode Island Supreme Court, including the right "even to
make new land by filling the flats in fiont of their land."' 162 The court
notes that in Engs it stated that it is "not aware that the state has ever
laid claim to any wharf so built, or any land so made, unless the cove
lands can be considered an exception."' 63 In Carr, the court also
noted the long-standing decisions in Rhode Island allowing the taking
of seaweed stranded on the beach by the littoral or riparian owner,
and refused to alter the rule saying:
To alter the rule after it has been so well settled and so
long acquiesced in would disturb rights of property
which in many cases have largely fixed the values
given and received for littoral estates, and this alone
would forbid the court to make such change without
the clearest proof of error. 164
The court found no such error and therefore the rule remained
good law. Perhaps more importantly, the court recognized that where
there was long-standing custom and usage regarding riparian rights,
such custom and usage affected the value of the riparian estate, and
the court would not change this tradition without it being a manifest
error of law. 6 ' Again, as in Aborn v. Smith, 66 the court demonstrated
'5 Carr v. Carpenter, 48 A. 805 (R.I. 1901).
160 See id. at 805-08.
161 Engs v. Peckham, 11 R.I. 210(1875).
162 Carr, 48 A. at 806 (quoting Engs, 11 R.I. at 210).
6 Id. (quoting Engs, 11 R.I. at 210).
"6 Id. at 808.
161 See id.
6 Aborn v. Smith, 12 R.I. 370 (1879).
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sensitivity to the importance of preserving the settled expectations of
property owners based upon generations of custom and usage. 167 The
court's position obviously indicates that the long history in Rhode
Island of recognizing the ownership of filled tidal lands in the private
owner would not be abandoned, absent a manifest error of law.
The court further clarified rights to filled tidal lands in
Dawson v. Broome, which involved a residential subdivision platted
on submerged land. 168 In that action, the court recognized that filling
in tidal water with the permission of a harbor master was the
equivalent of filling to a harbor line. 169 The court then quoted with
approval prior court decisions, including Engs and Bailey, in reaching
its decision.'70
However, the authority of a harbor master is not unlimited, at
least where a harbor line is involved. In Rhode Island Motor Co. v.
City of Providence,' the harbor master gave approval for the City of
Providence to establish in tidal water a walkway and beach house
located on piles, which extended beyond the harbor line. 72 Despite
the harbor commissioner's approval, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
held the assent invalid, and ruled that the harbor commissioner had
no right to allow encroachments beyond the harbor line. 7 1
In reaching its decision, the court cited Allen and reiterated
that:
The public rights secured by this trust are the
rights of passage, of navigation, and of fishery, and
these rights extend to all land below high-water mark,
unless it has been so used, built upon, or occupied as
167 See Carr, 48 A. at 806, 808.
168 Dawson v. Broome, 53 A. 151 (R.I. 1902).
169 See id. at 158.
70 See id. at 155-57; Engs v. Peckham, 11 R.I. 210 (1875); Bailey v. Burges, 11 R.I. 330
(1876).
, ' Rhode Island Motor Co. v. City of Providence, 55 A. 696 (1903).
172 See id.
173 See id. at 698.
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to prevent the passage of boats and the natural ebb
and flow of the tide .... Until actual filling out, the
public rights exist as before.'74
The court also quoted Clark v. Peckham, stating that "[s]o
long as the dock is not filled by the owner of the bank, it is subject to
thejus publicum of being used for passage by the whole public.'"
Clearly, the court reaffirmed in 1903 its view that filling of
tidal land extinguished public trust rights in the reclaimed land.176
The extent of colonial Rhode Island's authority to govern the
land below the high water mark was at issue in New York, N.H. &
H.R. Co. v. Horgan."7 In that action, two private parties asserted title
to filled tidal land in Newport.' Plaintiffs based their title to the
disputed land on an 1863 deed from the City, which expressly
excepted from the operation of the deed any private rights included
in the land described. 179  The deed was preauthorized and
subsequently ratified by the General Assembly. 8
The defendant offered evidence of a 1739 meeting of the
freemen of Newport, where they voted to convey to defendant's
predecessor in title certain land for construction of a wharf, including
all rights held by the Town of Newport in certain tide-flowed land. '81
The lower court concluded that the Town of Newport had no power
to grant title to land flowed by tide water, such power having been
delegated to the General Assembly by the Charter of 1663."82
The Supreme Court noted that tidal land below mean high
'14 Id. at 697.
' Id. (quoting Clark v. Peckham, 10 R.I. 35 (1871)).
176 See id.
' New York, N.H. & H.R. Co. v. Horgan, 56 A. 179 (R.I. 1903).
See id. at 179.
179 See id.
ISO See id.
"18 See id. at 180.
.82 See id.
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water had been held in the crown until the state became independent,
and since then had resided in the General Assembly. 8 3 It also noted
that the 1663 Charter "was ample to endow the colony with full
dominion and royalty over the shore and tide-flowed land ... so that,
acting by the express authority of the crown, the colonial General
Assembly had good right to regulate the use and improvement of this
portion of their domain." 84
The court stated that because towns and private individuals
merely assumed the right to occupy tidal-flowed lands without
specific authorization from the King or his colonial government, they
may have acquired no rights below the high water mark. ' 5 However,
the court then stated that counsel in the trial court had neglected to
introduce the 1707 Resolution of the General Assembly, and that by
this resolution "the General Assembly of the colony, in 1707, by a
statute... saw fit to grant these very powers to the several towns."' 86
The court concluded that "[t]aking into account, then, the law of
1707, we find that the land in question was private property at the
time of the grant to the plaintiff's predecessor, and hence was not
included in the grant. The plaintiffs title therefore fails ....
Thus, the court recognized that colonial grants of tide-flowed
lands to private individuals were valid to convey private property
interests, given the authority of the 1707 Resolution, and that a
subsequent state grant, given under the terms that it would not impair
private property rights, could not affect these rights.
88
In City of Providence v. Comstock, the court detailed the early
history of filling in the state, and particularly in the City of
Providence. 8 9 In its survey, the court noted:
18' See id.
184 Id. at 180-81.
See id.
i ld. at 181.
187 Id.
188 See id.
"' See City of Providence v. Comstock, 65 A. 307 (R.I. 1906).
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And the common law in this regard is in force in this
country except as it has been changed by local
legislation or custom.
There is a general impression, arising from
some remarks by Angell in his Treatise on Tide
Waters (2 Ed.) 1847, that the power of this state over
tide-flowed lands is less than was originally given it
by the common law, in that in Rhode Island a littoral
proprietor has the natural right to extend his wharves
and to fill flats into the salt water until he is stopped
by the demands of navigation. Mr. Angell says (page
236): 'In Rhode Island an opinion has long prevailed
throughout the portion of the State contiguous to tide
water, that the proprietor of an estate adjoining the
salt water might lawfully augment it, by embanking in
and upon the water, so long as he did not encroach
upon nor obstruct what is generally denominated the
channel, or, in other words, so long as he did no injury
whatever to the public. Hence it is that the custom
has been general to make accessions of land in this
manner without any suspicion of the want ofright and
authority so to do, and consequently without
obtaining any formal and express sanction of the
sovereign or legislative power.' But Mr. Angell
immediately proceeds to quote a colonial statute of
May, 1707, found in R.I. Col. Rec. vol. 4, p. 24
(printed since he wrote), which gave to the several
towns the right to license such wharves and
extensions of the shore in their respective borders,
and very well accounts for the absence of applications
to the General Assembly for such permission. This
court has, however, affirmed the view taken by Angell,
and confirmed the privilege of the littoral proprietor
to fill out flats or build wharves untilforbidden by the
1997]
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state. 90
The court then went on to note that in Providence wharfing and filling was
regulated since its early history, adding:
In Providence, at least, the riparian owners did not
assume the right to build wharves without permission
of the authorities. The power to regulate the building
of wharves may have been assumed originally by the
town without warrant, but it was apparently
acquiesced in by the state, and from 1707, as we have
seen, it was exercised under the express grant of
power from the General Assembly which was then
made. From that time on the town counsel exercised
full authority to define the lines of the cove, and to
limit the extension of wharves or permanent filling by
littoral proprietors, and to check encroachments upon
the public waters. "'
The court's statement in City of Providence v. Comstock
clearly appraised Rhode Island's extensive history of filling under
authority of the 1707 Resolution, and subsequently the history of
filling in Providence under the town's authority.92
At issue in Armour and Co. v. City of Newport'93 was the
1739 grant that had been at issue in New York, N.H. & H.R. Co. v.
Horgan'94 from the Town of Newport to certain individuals, which
included tidal lands. The first question presented to the court was
whether the grant conveyed a fee simple interest. "' The court
,9 Id. at 308-09 (emphasis added).
Id. at 309 (emphasis added).
192 See id.
'9' Armour & Co. v. City of Newport, 110 A. 645 (R.I. 1920).
" New York, N.H. & H.R. Co. v. Horgan, 56 A. 179 (R.I. 1903).
195 See Armour, 110 A. at 646.
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reviewed the language of the grant, noting that it was a vote of the
freemen of the town, and there was no recorded deed.'96 The court
also noted that "public grants of this nature are to be construed most
favorably to the grantor."' 97  Nevertheless, the court found that
despite the absence of specific language conveying a fee simple
interest, the intention of the town appeared to be to convey an estate
in fee.'98
The court then turned to the primary question at issue,
whether certain language in the grant established a public easement
that continued in effect and could be enforced against a private owner
of buildings in the easement area.199
Noting that the language of the vote shows a "clear intention
to reserve an easement for the public," the court was cautious in
finding an easement existed, and investigated evidence of
"contemporaneous construction."2" The court recited evidence that
suggested a history of attempts to leave the thirty foot way open, or
not to materially obstruct it, examined deeds, and concluded that "the
various grantors were not overbold in asserting full title to the land in
question until Patrick H. Horgan became interested in the
property."' ' Given all the facts, the court found that the grant
established a thirty foot public easement, which continued to remain
for the benefit of the public.20 2
'96 See id. at 647.
197 id.
' See id.
"'9 See id. at 646. The following language was at issue in the grant:
and always leaving thirty feet in width of the said wharf on the south side
free and clear of buildings & other incumbrances for the better landing of
all sorts of wood lumber &c. for the benefit of the inhabitants according
to the grant in the year 1702 (1707?), excepting the building of cranes &c.
for conveniency of unloading vessels &c.
Id. at 646.
'00 Id. at 647-48.
201 Id.
202 See id. at 649.
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The most striking aspect of Armour is that the court did not
assert, or even suggest, that title to the entire wharf would be in the
state; or that under the public trust doctrine the state would maintain
ownership rights in the wharf; or that the state retained the right under
the public trust doctrine to use the wharf for public purposes. °3 The
court did not even raise these issues, its sole focus having been
whether the original grant contained an easement, and if so, whether
the easement was still enforceable. 24 The court's failure to raise
these issues indicates that construction of the wharf over tidal waters
extinguished the public trust rights in the wharf, and the only public
rights that remained were those explicitly conditioned in the grant.
Similarly, public rights to wharfage in Newport were at issue
in Thompson v. Sullivan. °5 In that action, certain citizens of Newport
sought to block a lease between the City of Newport and Newport
Yacht Club.2 6 The lease in question involved Gravelly Point, the
easterly point of which was a city wharf.20 7 One of the allegations
was that the proprietors of Long Wharf, who platted Gravelly Point,
dedicated the wharf for public use. 208 The court observed:
There is nothing in the record from which it
can be determined that the proprietors of Long Wharf
before or after the allotment of Gravelly Point in
1757, either jointly or severally, ever took steps to
construct a wharf or dock. Assuming that they did, it
is not likely that they did so with the intention of
dedicating it to a public use and thus deny to




205 Thompson v. Sullivan, 148 A.2d 130 (R.I. 1959).
20 See id. at 132.
207 See id. at 133.
20' See id. at 132-33.
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The trial justice commented on the cost of
such construction, and coupling this with the
importance of transportation by water in colonial days
he concluded that the proprietors would not have
subjected these valuable rights to pre-emption by the
public. We are of the opinion that in the absence of
evidence to the contrary the conclusion reached by the
trial justice is not unreasonable.0 9
Because the public was challenging the exclusive nature of the
lease to the Newport Yacht Club, it is again noteworthy that neither
the public trust doctrine nor the assertion that the state actually owned
fee-simple title to the wharf for the benefit of the public was raised by
any of the litigants or the court. The absence of such arguments is
completely consistent with over a century of court decisions
indicating that upland owners hold title to wharves and reclaimed
tidal lands.
In Nugent ex rel. Collins v. Vallone,1 ° the court rejected a
contention that the construction of a 900-foot pier into Narragansett
Bay would interfere with the rights of the public in tidal waters and
would unlawfully appropriate submerged land.2" The court upheld
the common law right to wharf out in the absence of interference with
navigation or the rights of other riparian proprietors, and it found
erection of the pier accorded with public trust rights." 2
In State v. Ibbison,2 3 the Supreme Court relied on common
law to fix the boundary at the shore between public land and private
land.2"4 The court found that prior cases, such as Allen v. Allen,2 5 had
209 Id. at 136.
210 Nugent ex rel. Collins v. Vallone, 161 A.2d 802 (R.I. 1960).
211 See id. at 806.
2 See id. at 804-06.
23 State v. Ibbison, 448 A.2d 728 (R.I. 1982).
214 See id. at 730.
2"5 Allen v. Allen, 32 A. 166 (R.I. 1895).
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relied upon common law and that "the only permissible action for us
to take is to affix the boundary as was done at common law and
which this court in Allen declared to be the settled policy of this
state. 21 6  In setting that boundary, the court rejected for such
boundary "a visible line on the shore indicated by the reach of an
average high tide and further indicated by drifts and seaweed along
the shore." ' 7 The court clearly was concerned with ensuring fairness
to private property owners as well as recognizing the common law
upon which the Rhode Island courts have relied in public trust
matters. 218
Once again, the court successfully balanced the interests of
private shorefront owners and the interests of the public in
establishing the boundary between private and public property.
It is against this rich history of Rhode Island jurisprudence
116 Ibbison, 448 A.2d at 730.
2I7 Id. at 729.
218 The court stated:
In fixing the landward boundary of the shore at the
mean-high-tide line, we are mindful that there is a disadvantage in that this
point is not readily identifiable by the casual observer. We doubt,
however, that any boundary could be set that would be readily apparent to
an observer when we consider the varied topography of our shoreline. The
mean-high-tide line represents the point that can be determined
scientifically with the greatest certainty. Clearly, a line determined over
a period of years using modem scientific techniques is more precise than
a mark made by the changing tides driven by the varying forces of nature
Additionally, we feel that our decision best balances the interests
between littoral owners and all the people of the state. Setting the
boundary at the point where the spring tides reach would unfairly take
from littoral owners land that is dry for most of the month. Similarly,
setting the boundary below the mean-high-tide line at the line of the mean
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that the dicta in Allen v. Allen219 and Engs v. Peckham220 must be
evaluated. When considered together, what emerges from these
decisions is that, over its long history, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court was well aware of the English common law antecedents to
Rhode Island's public trust doctrine and how this doctrine was
modified in Rhode Island's early history, and that the court was very
careful to balance the property rights of the riparian upland owner
with the rights of the public under the public trust doctrine. As
recently as the court's decision in State v. Ibbison and as early as its
decision in Clark v. Peckham the Rhode Island Supreme Court was
concerned with the private property rights of upland owners. 2 ' The
court apparently recognized that reclaiming land from the sea by
filling below mean high tide constituted the early public works
projects of the state. However, the state did not have the funds to pay
222for these improvements. For example, it was not uncommon for
the General Assembly to authorize a lottery to pay for the filling of
tidal land, as was done for the construction of the Market House in
Providence in 1773.22 However, most of the filling below mean high
tide was done at the expense of private individuals. 224 By reclaiming
such tidal lands, these riparian owners provided for needed housing
in Rhode Island by platting lots below mean high tide.225 They
fostered the commercial development of the state by constructing
market houses, fish processing facilities, trading facilities, stores, and
other commercial establishments, and they fostered navigation and
commerce in the state by constructing wharves, docks, and other
shipping facilities.226
219 Allen v. Allen, 32 A. 166 (R.I. 1895).
220 Engs v. Peckham, I1 R.I. 210 (R.I. 1875).
,.1 See State v. Ibbison, 448 A.2d 728 (R.I. 1982); Clark v. Peckham, 9 R.I. 445 (1870).
222 See CADY, supra note 6, at 33-35.
221 See id. at 48-50
224 See supra note 29.
225 Id.
226 See generally Holleran, supra note 29; CADY, supra note 6, at 106, 120, 178
(unnumbered photographs).
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Nowhere in the court's decisions prior to Hall v.
Nascimento227 was it held, or even stated, that land created by private
filling that was built upon and improved, was actually in state, not
private, ownership. Nowhere do the legislative enactments, from the
Resolution of 1707 to the numerous harbor line ordinances, indicate
that title to the land acquired was conditional on being used for public
trust purposes, was revocable at the will of the state, or was held by
the state.
The discussions by the Rhode Island Supreme Court, and the
dicta in such cases as Allen v. Allen,228 Engs v. Peckham,229 and
others, clearly set forth the court's judgment of the status of filled
tidal lands. The court properly reserved deciding issues where not
necessary to resolution of the case. However, the court stated "in the
absence of any decision by this court ... we are of the opinion that
... dicta are entitled to much consideration, especially as they seem
to have been acquiesced in ever since they were stated. 230
2. Title To The Former Cove Lands.
Although the prior discussion has focused largely on land
filled to a harbor line, or to the equivalent of a harbor line,23" ' the same
general principles deduced from these cases apply to the title to lands
created by the filling of the former Providence Cove or Great Salt
Cove, as it was known.232 This area, known as the Cove Lands, was
a tidal cove of several hundred acres and now is much of downtown
227 Hall v. Nascimento, 594 A.2d 874 (R.I. 1991).
228 Allen v. Allen, 32 A. 166 (R.I. 1895).
229 Engs v. Peckham, 11 R.I. 210 (R.I. 1875).
230 Jackvony v. Powell, 21 A.2d 554, 558 (R.I. 1941).
231 Such as land filled with state authorization or acquiescence.
232 See generally City of Providence v. Comstock, 65 A. 307 (R.I. 1906) (referring to
Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892), which generally affirms public trust
doctrine principles). Note that in the cases discussed in this section the court relied heavily
on the fact that a state grant conveyed the cove lands to the City of Providence.
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Providence's prime business and commercial real estate.233 With
regard to the former Cove Lands, there is also specific case law which
is determinative.
The State of Rhode Island conveyed "to the City of
Providence, of all the right, title and interest that the State has in and
to the Cove Lands, (so-called,) in said City, being the lands now or
heretofore flowed by tide water above Weybosset Bridge, in said
City . "..."234 The Cove Lands Grant was authorized by General
Assembly Resolution approved by the House of Representatives
February 23, 1870, and by the Senate March 2, 1870.235
In 1888, the General Assembly authorized the filling of the
Cove Basin, and in 1889, the Providence City Council authorized the
selling of the Cove Basin, the Cove Promenade, and the Cove Lands
to the railroads for construction of a new railroad terminal building.236
In 1890 the General Assembly authorized construction of a passenger
terminal by several railroads.237 The Cove Basin was filled in 1891
and 1892.238
As previously discussed in Clarke v. City of Providence, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court soundly rejected in 1888 a challenge
from a property owner in the vicinity of the Cove Basin to the state's
efforts to fill the basin, discontinue the park, and sell the Cove
Lands.239
In doing so, the court stated that public rights could be
extinguished by filling tidal lands not only by express grant from the
state, but also by tacit acquiescence or implied or express consent of
the General Assembly, and that the filling need not be for public trust
... See Holleran, supra note 29, at 65.
2" Resolution Relating to the Cove Lands, State of Rhode Island and Providence
Plantations General Assembly, Jan. Sess., 1870 (on file with author).
211 See id.
23b See Holleran, supra note 29, at 81.
," See id.
... See id.
... See Clarke v. City of Providence, 15 A. 763, 766-67.
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purposes in order to extinguish such public rights.24 The court
rejected the assertion that the Cove Lands Grant did not extinguish
rights of fishery and privileges of the shore in the former Cove
Lands.24'
The following year the court again was faced with a challenge
to the Cove Lands Grant. In Mowry v. City of Providence,242 a
resident tried to prevent the city from selling any portion of the Cove
Promenade or Cove Basin or filling the basin on the ground that
although the state conveyed title to the property "it has not alienated,
and could not, by so doing, alienate the beneficial rights of the people
without a vote of the people authorizing such alienation, which vote
has never been had. ,243 In essence, the challenge was that the General
Assembly could not convey the property free of public trust rights
without a vote of the citizens.
The court found that a private individual did not have the right
to maintain such an action and the General Assembly clearly had the
right to relinquish such public rights in the former Cove Lands:
We held in that case [Clarke v. City of Providence]
that the state, or the general assembly as the organ of
the state, is the representative of the public or people
as to the public right, and as such has power to release
the right; the general assembly having in the matter
the authority, not simply of the English crown, but of
both crown and parliament, except so far as it has
been limited by the constitution of the state, or by the
constitution and laws of the United States. There is
no precedent for the claim that the proper mode of
relinquishing such a public right is by popular vote.
2 44
24U See id. at 765-66.
241 See id. at 766-67.
242 Mowry v. City of Providence, 16 A. 511 (R.I. 1889).
241 Id. at 511.
244 Id.
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In Murphy v. Bullock,245 the court again had occasion to
consider the Cove Lands Grant. In that action, private party plaintiffs
attempted to assert rights against the city to lands the city claimed
were former Cove Lands, and conveyed to the city by the state in
1870.246 In construing the 1870 grant, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court stated that in 1870 the state owned the Cove Lands, and the
deed conveying the Cove Lands "now or heretofore flowed by tide
water" pertained to land then flowed by the tide as well as to a large
tract of land that formerly had been a part of the cove but where the
tide had ceased to flow because of filling by the city in 1857.47 The
court found that the Cove Lands Grant encompassed "land that was
then flowed by the tide and land which had been part of the cove, and
was still traceable as such, and which had not been already made the
subject of legal grant or appropriation. 2 48 The court found the land
in question to be former Cove Lands, and thus the private party could
not sustain title against the city, which held title by virtue of the 1870
deed.249
Yet another challenge to the Cove Lands Grant was before the
court in 1906, and it appears that the court had by that time had quite
enough of such challenges. 5 ° In City of Providence v. Comstock,
private party defendants were lessees of land covered by tide water,
which they occupied as a warehouse supported on piles driven into
the ground. 251 The defendants' primary claim was that their lessor
had acquired ownership of the original shore and therefore acquired
title to the filled land, and that this gave them riparian rights entitling
them to occupy the bed of the river, notwithstanding the conveyance
of this river bed by the state to the City of Providence by the 1870
245 Murphy v. Bullock, 37 A. 348 (R.I. 1897).
246 See id.
247 See id. at 349.
248 Id.
249 See id. at 350.
2 See City of Providence v. Comstock, 65 A. 307 (R.I. 1906).
," See id. at 307.
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grant.252
The court specifically addressed the United States Supreme
Court decision in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois253 noting
that the United States Supreme Court found that a state "may convey
parcels of tide-flowed lands to individuals for the promotion of
navigation or 'when parcels can be disposed of without detriment to
the public interest in the lands and waters remaining.' 254 The Rhode
Island Supreme Court flatly held that "the defendants are in error in
their notion that the State was not competent to give a clear title to
the plaintiff free of all servitudes or rights in the nature of public
trusts .. "255
The court continued with an elaborate and detailed discussion
of the degree to which the City of Providence historically has
regulated the filling of tidal lands, clearly demonstrating that such
lands were not filled without public consideration and were not filled
indiscriminately. 256
The court also noted that the draw of the Weybosset Bridge,
which separated the Cove Lands from the access to Narragansett Bay
and the ocean beyond, was discontinued in approximately 1816 and
that from that time the waters of the cove ceased to be actually
navigable from the sea and the "public right of commercial navigation
has ceased, and the private riparian right of mere access to the salt
water, if any still existed, became of no appreciable value., 257
Finally, the court noted that at the January 1867 session "the
General Assembly passed a resolution revoking all grants of any
portion of the cove lands which had not been accepted and the
conditions of which had not been complied with., 258 The court then
2S, See id. at 307-08.
253 Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
2" City of Providence v. Comstock, 65 A. at 308 (citing Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S.
at 455-56).
25- Id. at 308 (emphasis added).
256 See id. at 3l10-11.
257 Id. at 311.
258 Id. at 312.
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stated:
This court has repeatedly held that by this deed [i.e.,
the 1870 Grant] the State conveyed to the city the
lands described therein in fee simple. The land in
dispute in this case is, and in 1870 was, flowed by tide
water, and is a portion of the lands described in said
deed. I find that this title in fee simple is not modified
or restricted by any littoral or other rights appertaining
to the land leased to the defendants on the east bank of
the present channel of the Moshassuck river, or to the
land of said lessors on the east side of Canal street.2 59
Accordingly, no less than three times the court has affirmed
its judgment that the grant by the State of Rhode Island to the City of
Providence in 1870 conveyed the Cove Lands in fee simple absolute
to the City of Providence, unburdened by any public trust rights.
V. HALL V. NASCIMENTO
Against this background the Rhode Island Supreme Court in
1991 was presented with its first public trust case since State v.
Ibbison.2
60
In Hall v. Nascimento, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
decided a title dispute regarding land at Common Fence Point in
Portsmouth. 26' At issue was title to ten feet of former beach area and
260 feet of contiguous land created by the placing of fill below mean
high tide.26 2 The court found that the trial court erred in awarding
title of a portion of the 270-foot area to an adjacent lot owner, holding
that any such claim must be based on littoral rights to the tide lands
I d. (citations omitted).
2to State v. Ibbison, 448 A.2d 728 (R.I. 1982).
.61 See Hall v. Nascimento, 594 A.2d 874 (R.I. 1991).
212 See id. at 875.
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that were filled.263 Because the lot owner's predecessors in title never
abutted the former high water mark, the lot owner could claim no
such littoral rights.264 The court also found that the association of
landowners in the plat abutting the filled land, whose predecessor in
title held the littoral rights, did not acquire title to the filled tidal
lands.2 5 Rather, the court held that ownership of the filled tidal land
was in the State of Rhode Island:
It is well settled in Rhode Island that pursuant to the
public trust doctrine the State maintains title in fee to
all soil within its boundaries that lies below the
high-water mark, and it holds such land in trust for the
use of the public. The high-water mark on the original
shoreline that existed prior to the 1948 dredge and fill
was located within the bounds of the ten-foot strip of
beach area ... retained by the association .... In Carr
v. Carpenter, 22 R.I. 528, 529, 48 A. 805, 805 (1901),
this court established that the owners of lands adjoining
navigable waters have the right to "enjoy what remains
of the rights and privileges in the soil beyond their strict
boundary lines, after giving to the public the full
enjoyment of their rights." The association, therefore,
as owner of the land adjoining the waters, does not
automatically lose all rights to the submerged soil and
subsequently the filled area.266
The court's decision in Hall v. Nascimento generated
tremendous concern throughout Rhode Island by casting into doubt
the status of title to the literally thousands of private properties
throughout the State that are located on filled tidal land (i.e., land
26 See id.
24 See id. at 876.
265 See id.
26 Id. at 877 (citations omitted).
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created by the placing of fill below mean high tide).,67
As discussed above, prior to Hall the Rhode Island Supreme
Court had never asserted that title to filled tidal lands is in the State
of Rhode Island.268 Rather, the writings of the court, for well over
100 years, have been to the contrary.269 As a result of the Hall
decision, some elements of Rhode Island state government took the
position that the State of Rhode Island holds title to all filled tidal
lands in trust for the public for public trust purposes.270
As a result of the decision in Hall, the General Assembly
created a Legislative Task Force on Filled Tidal Lands in the 1992
legislative session.27 ' That task force drafted a bill, which was based
on a "legislative finding" that "in the case of Hall v. Nascimento the
Rhode Island Supreme Court held that, pursuant to the public trust
doctrine, the State of Rhode Island holds the title in fee to filled tidal
lands within its borders and it holds such lands in trust for the benefit
of the public. ' 72
The draft legislation went on to propose extensive regulation of
what formerly had been considered private property. 73 The
legislation drafted by the Task Force proposed to make a distinction
between "privately filled tidal land" (i.e., tidal land filled under color
of state law or with authority of a state or municipality) and "state
filled tidal land" (i.e., all other filled tidal land).274 Under the draft
legislation, privately filled tidal land would have been burdened with
a perpetual easement allowing public access across the land to the
211 See Tidal Trauma, supra note 38, at 14; Frederiksen, supra note 7, at 5; Help Protect
the Public Trust, SAVE THE BAY ISSUE BRIEF (Save the Bay, Providence, R.I.), undated
leaflet.
268 See supra text accompanying notes 219-30
269 See id.
270 See H. 9262A, Jan. Sess. (R.I. 1992).
,' See id.
' See id. §46-29-2(a). As discussed below, the language in the draft bill misstates the
holding of Hall v. Nascimento.
211 See H. 9262A.
2" See id. §§ 46-29-5, 46-29-4 to 46-29-11.
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shore.275 This would apparently constitute an easement for lateral
access to the shore as well as an easement to cross private property
perpendicular to the shore in order to reach the water. This was
proposed without regard for the current use of such property.276
Under the proposed legislation, a property owner must produce
evidence that the land was filled under color of state law or the
authority of a state or municipality to establish that such land was
"privately" filled tidal land.2 77 Because much filling occurred in the
1700s and early 1800s, when records were poorly kept, or no longer
available, this could be difficult or impossible to establish.
Additionally, much filling occurred by custom, with the knowledge
and acquiescence of the government, but generally without a formal
permit or approval.27
Under the proposed legislation, if a landowner could not
demonstrate that his property was privately filled, the filled land
would be deemed to be state filled land, and the property owner
would be required to lease such property back from the state.279 There
was considerable objection to the draft legislation, and the General
Assembly adjourned without taking action on it.280 Nevertheless, the
activities of the Task Force and its proposals were well-known in the
business community, including: lenders, who may have mortgages
on property deemed to be state lands; title insurers, who may be at
risk on titles they insured on land determined to be filled tidal land;
27 See id. § 46-29-6.
216 See id.
277 See id. § 46-29-3.
2" See generally Providence Steam-Engine Co. v. Providence & Stonington S.S. Co., 12
R.I. 348, 363-64 (1879) (Potter, J., concurring) (discussing general filling and wharfing in
Rhode Island's early history). The author's review of historical records in preparing for
Greater Providence Chamber of Commerce v. State, 657 A.2d 1038 (R.I. 1995), revealed
inconsistencies and gaps in the recordkeeping activities of the various commissions and
councils concerned with filling tidal land.
279 See H. 9262A § 46-29-3.
20 See Michelle Hirsch, Solid-Waste Issue Tops RI Environmental Agenda, PROVIDENCE
Bus. NEWS, July 5, 1992, at 13.
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and businesses located on filled tidal land. 8' The proposals also were
known generally among property owners near or adjacent to the
shore.2"'
Considerable media comment and speculation on the impact of
this decision resulted, a result of much of downtown Providence
being located on filled tidal land.283 Additionally, special interest
groups asserted that the "momentous" decision in Hall "will be the
ultimate touchstone for preserving Newport's historic waterfront and
assuring public access and usage of our precious coastal resources for
decades to come." 284 The Friends of the Waterfront suggested a
moratorium on all building on coastal tidal lands, a survey of all such
lands and a state lease of such lands. 85 Such a moratorium and
survey could take years and effectively freeze development,
substantial rehabilitation and even sales of lands determined or
suspected to be filled tidal lands, particularly if bank financing was
involved.
VI. GREATER PROVIDENCE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE V.
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
Given the questions raised by Hall v. Nascimento,286 many
institutions in the Rhode Island business community sought
clarification of the Rhode Island Supreme Court's position on the
public trust doctrine. On March 18, 1994, plaintiffs Greater
Providence Chamber of Commerce, Rhode Island School of Design,
Narragansett Electric Company, and Providence Gas Company, and
281 See Tidal Trauma, supra note 38, at 14; Hirsch, supra note 280, at 13.
.Hirsch, supra note 280, at 13. The author has been contacted by concerned property
owners for legal advice regarding property on filled tidal land.
28 See Tidal Trauma, supra note 38, at 14 (editorializing against legislation proposed in
response to Hall v. Nascimento, 594 A.2d 874 (R.I. 1991)).
2" Mary Ferrazzoli, Holding the Coast in Trust, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Apr. 14, 1992, at
A-6. Mary Ferrazzoli wrote as President of Friends of the Waterfront.
285 Id.
286 Hall v. Nascimento, 594 A.2d 874 (R.I. 1991).
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defendant State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations filed a
Joint Petition and Agreed Statement of Facts pursuant to R.I. Gen.
Laws section 9-30-1287 for a declaratory judgment regarding the effect
of the public trust doctrine on certain interests each plaintiff had in
real property. 8 Pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws section
9-24-25,289 the Agreed Statement of Facts ("Agreed Statement") was
filed with the Providence County Superior Court clerk for
certification of this action to the Rhode Island Supreme Court for
determination.29 ° Certification was granted by order entered March
21, 1994.291
The Attorney General, Jeffrey Pine, and his Environmental
Advocate, Michael Rubin represented the State and consented to the
expedited procedure and filing of a joint petition to facilitate
resolution of the issue, given its importance to the citizens of the
state.292 Absent such cooperation, a resolution of the issues could
have taken several more years.
On June 20, 1994, plaintiffs and defendant filed a Supplemental
Agreed Statement of Facts with the Rhode Island Supreme Court.2 9 3
Four properties were at issue in the Greater Providence Chamber of
Commerce litigation; two were parcels located in the former Cove
2"87 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-30-1 (Michie Supp. 1996).
288 See Agreed Statement of Facts, Greater Providence Chamber of Commerce v. State,
657 A.2d 1038 (R.I. 1995) (No. 94-0153) [hereinafter Agreed Statement].
289 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-24-25 (Michie Supp. 1996).
290 See id.
2" See Order, Greater Providence Chamber of Commerce v. State, 657 A.2d 1038 (R.I.
1995) (No. 94-1476).
292 See Entry of Appearance, Greater Providence Chamber of Commerce v. State, 657 A.2d
1038 (R.I. 1995) (No. 94-1476). The agreement to the expedited procedure and filing of a
joint petition was made at a meeting with Attorney General Pine, Environmental Advocate
Michael Rubin, Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank President Frederick Lorham,
Providence Gas Company President James Dodge, and the author. Rhode Island Hospital
Trust National Bank filed an amicus brief on the case.
2" See Supplemental Agreed Statement of Facts, Greater Providence Chamber of
Commerce v. State, 657 A.2d 1038 (R.I. 1995) (No. 94-0125).
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Lands and two were created by the placing of fill to a harbor line.294
The two properties located in the former Great Salt Cove are the
former "West Building" of the Union Station Complex, which was
built between 1896 and 1898 and is now a three-story office building
occupied by the Greater Providence Chamber of Commerce, and the
former Providence Market House, constructed in 1773 and now
utilized by the Rhode Island School of Design for classrooms and
offices.295
An approximately 8.31 acre parcel owned by Narragansett
Electric Company, currently used to distribute electrical energy to
downtown Providence, and an approximately 16.5 acre parcel owned
by Providence Gas Company that currently consists of a facility that
converts liquefied natural gas and distributes natural gas, both are
located on land created by the placing of fill to a harbor line in the
Providence River.29 6
In its Brief, the State conceded that the 1870 Cove Lands Grant
extinguished public trust rights in the Greater Providence Chamber
of Commerce property and the Rhode Island School of Design
property.29 7
The State raised several primary arguments in their defense of
the declaratory judgment action. First, the State argued that in Hall
v. Nascimento the court had made it clear that, notwithstanding the
dicta of Allen v. Allen298 and Engs v. Peckham,299 the state retained
ownership of all filled tidal land, absent a deed from the state clearly
conveying its public trust interest in tidal land.3" Secondly, and most
importantly, the State asserted that the public trust rights can be
extinguished only by a valid legislative grant from the General
2" See Agreed Statement, supra note 288, at 4, 8, 10-11.
29' See id.
,."' See id. at 5-8, 11-14.
2" Brief of the State of Rhode Island at 3 n.2, 41, Greater Providence Chamber of
Commerce v. -State, 657 A.2d 1038 (R.I. 1995)(No. 94-0153) [hereinafter State's Brief]
298 Allen v. Allen, 32 A. 166 (R.I. 1895).
299 Engs v. Peckham, 11 R.I. 210 (1875).
31 See State's Brief, supra note 297, at 16-34.
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Assembly clearly and unequivocally conveying public trust rights.3"'
Finally, the State argued that the Rhode Island Supreme Court's
decision in Jackvony v. Powell"2 established access along the shore
as a public trust right, and that the public continues to have access
acrossfilled tidal lands.30 3
The State also asserted, without citing authority, that plaintiffs
Narragansett Electric Company and Providence Gas Company have
a "license to exclusively occupy the premises (subject, of course, to
existing regulatory schemes)," and that the public rights in the
Narragansett Electric property and the Providence Gas property "are
not self-executing, but must await affirmative legislative action in
order to be exercised.-
30 4
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a deed from the
State of Rhode Island to the City of Providence in 1870, conveying
all of the Cove Lands to the City, extinguished public trust rights in
the Greater Providence Chamber of Commerce and Rhode Island
School of Design properties located in the former Providence Cove
Lands.30 5 As Justice Shea, writing for the court, stated:
The question pertaining to these two Cove
Lands parcels is whether the public-trust doctrine was
extinguished in the Cove Lands by the state's express
grant of those lands to the city of Providence in 1870.
We hold that it was extinguished. The Cove Lands
grant is an example of the principle that the public-trust
doctrine can be extinguished by a valid legislative state
grant. This court's decision in City of Providence v.
Comstock, 27 R.I. 537, 65 A. 307 (1906), aptly
30' See id. at 37-40.
30 Jackvony v. Powell, 21 A.2d 554 (R.I. 1941).
30 See State's Brief, supra note 297, at 10.
304 Id. at 75.
30' See Greater Providence Chamber of Commerce v. State, 657 A.2d 1038, 1039-40 (R.I.
1995).
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demonstrates why, in the instances of the Cove Lands
parcels, an express legislative grant was appropriate." 6
The court went on to note that in City of Providence v.
Comstock"7 no legislation had recognized any riparian or littoral
rights in the owners of the land bordering on the original lines of the
salt water, and that streets had been laid out around it for the express
purpose of excluding such claims by cutting off access to the water.0 8
The court also noted that there was much special legislation
pertaining specifically to the Cove Lands, unlike other filled land
areas. 30 9 The court then observed, "an express legislative grant was
necessary and appropriate to convey an interest in the Cove Lands
free of the public-trust doctrine."3' Accordingly, the Court's holding
leads to the conclusion that all properties located in the former
Providence Cove Lands are no longer subject to a claim of state
ownership under the public trust doctrine.
With regard to the two harbor line parcels, the Providence Gas
Company and Narragansett Electric Company properties, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court demonstrated concern that its decision in Hall
v. Nascimento3t ' not be interpreted beyond its narrow scope.32 The
court specifically affirmed its decision in Hall: "This Court continues
to support the opinion rendered in Hall. It was correct at the time it
was made and it is still appropriate.- 31 3  However, the court
distinguished Hall from the properties at issue in the Chamber of
Commerce litigation:
'06 Id. at 1040.
307 City of Providence v. Comstock, 27 R.I. 537 (1906).
30. See Greater Providence Chamber of Commerce, 657 A.2d at 1040.
'09 See id.
310 Id.
3 Hall v. Nascimento, 594 A.2d 874 (R.I. 1991).
312 See Greater Providence Chamber of Commerce, 657 A.2d at 1043.
313 Id.
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Let us state now, unequivocally, that Hall has
no application to the situation of the Cove Lands in
this case or to the gas company's or the electric
company's properties landward of the Harbor Lines.
Hall involved filling in an area with no harbor line
and no legislative authorization. Although there was
a permit from the Rhode Island Department of Public
Works, Division of Harbors and Rivers, the actual
filling was more than five times as extensive as that
authorized by the permit.3"4
Noting that the Providence Gas Company parcel had been filled
with express state approval, and the Narragansett Electric Company
parcel had been filled with the state's tacit or implied approval, and
that both properties had been improved substantially, the court stated
"these factors establish that the fee-simple absolute title rests in the
title holders, the electric company and the gas company."3 5 The
court thus effectively reaffirmed dicta in Engs v. Peckham31 6 and
Allen v. Allen3"7 that when land is created by the placing of fill to a
harbor line, or the equivalent of a harbor line, and improved, the land
becomes private property. 3'8 However, the court was careful to note
that its decision regarding parcels created by the placing of fill to a
harbor line only affected title to the two harbor line properties at issue
in the Chamber of Commerce litigation.31 9
In its decision, the court emphatically embraced the public trust
doctrine, recognizing its firm establishment in the law. As the Court
summarized:
314 Id.
"/ i. at 1043-44.
" Engs v. Peckham, 11 R.I. 210 (1875).
117 Allen v. Allen, 32 A. 166 (R.I. 1895)
.u See Greater Providence Chamber of Commerce, 657 A.2d at 1044.
. See id. at 1039.
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The principle espoused by the English common-
law public trust jurisprudence recognizes the unique
resource that tidal waters constitute and the necessity
that they be held by the sovereign in a trustee capacity
for the use and benefit of all citizens. Thus these
lands below the high-water mark will not be
appropriated by, or conferred upon, private
individuals for purely private benefit. It is this
principle that forms the foundation of the public-trust
doctrine in Rhode Island as well as in other states.320
The court also noted that "Rhode Island decisional law and this court
have never cast aside the public-trust doctrine. 32 1
The court also recognized that Hall v. Nascimento322 "does not
hold that if there is no valid legislative state grant, public trust rights
exist in land filled to a harbor line," but rather that the "decision [i.e.,
Hall] only acknowledges that the state may grant property free of the
public-trust doctrine, but there was no evidence of such a grant in that
[sic] record of that case. 32 3
The court specifically recognized the dicta in Engs v.
Peckham324 and Allen v. Allen 325 that the filling to a harbor line
"excluded" or "extinguished" the public trust rights in such
property.326 The Chamber of Commerce court then went on to state
its understanding of the meaning of harbor lines:
320 Id. at 1042.
321 Id.
322 Hall v. Nascimento, 594 A.2d 874 (R.I. 1991).
323 Greater Providence Chamber of Commerce, 657 A.2d at 1043.
324 Engs v. Peckham, 11 R.I. 210 (1875).
32' Allen v. Allen, 32 A. 166 (R.I. 1845)
32 See Greater Providence Chamber of Commerce, 657 A.2d at 1044.
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The harbor lines were drafted in cooperation between
state and local authorities to establish the point
beyond which fill, wharves, and other structures
would create an obstruction to navigation, commerce
and fishery. The opinions just referred to [i.e., Engs
v. Peckham and Allen v. Allen] reflect the state of
mind in those who created harbor lines, and they
confirm our conclusion that the state is in error in
arguing that only an express legislative grant can
extinguish the public trust in filled land. The state is
correct in its assertion that harbor lines establish
boundaries up to which filling could occur. The
harbor lines were a legislative determination,
generally made in conjunction with the local
government, that encroachment on the waters to the
harbor line would not constitute interference with
fishery, commerce, or navigation. 27
The court also recognized the importance of resolving the issue for the
thousands of filled tidal land properties throughout the state by establishing a test as
to when the public trust doctrine has been extinguished in filled tidal land.328 The test
applies not just to land filled to a harbor line but to land filled where no harbor line
existed:
A littoral owner who fills along his or her
shore line, whether to a harbor line or otherwise, with
the acquiescence or the express or implied approval of
the state and improves upon the land in justifiable
reliance on the approval, would be able to establish
title to that land that is free and clear .... Once the
littoral owner acquires title to the land in this manner,
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public-trust doctrine alone.329
This holding is predicated upon non-interference with the
public trust rights of fishery, commerce and navigation.33 The court
specifically provided that under such circumstances the littoral owner
''may pursue a course of action seeking to convey the deed to that
property to himself or herself and become owner in fee simple
absolute. . .. ,.31 Title insurers doing business in Rhode Island now
are considering what information they will require to issue title
insurance policies insuring that the filled tidal land at issue is free of
any claim of state ownership pursuant to the public trust doctrine.332
VII. CONCLUSION
Greater Providence Chamber of Commerce v. State is an
important decision that should allow owners to remove the cloud over
private title to the thousands of Rhode Island business, residences,
and commercial establishments located on filled tidal lands, allowing
them to be used, bought, sold, mortgaged, and insured without fear
that the state could sometime in the future claim an ownership interest
under the public trust doctrine.
The court's decision represents a careful balance of the public's
rights under the public trust doctrine and private property rights. The
court expressly reaffirmed the validity and the vitality of the public
trust doctrine in Rhode Island, under which the state continues to hold
all land below mean high tide for the benefit of the public for
purposes of fishery, commerce and navigation.3 33 However, the court
balanced this right with the rights of ownership of private property.
I ld. (emphasis in original).
330 See id.
331 Id.
332 The author gained this information from interviewing lawyers and officials of local title
insurance companies.
31 See Greater Providence Chamber of Commerce, 657 A.2d at 1041-44.
1997]
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
Many of the properties at issue have been held in private ownership
for generations, if not hundreds of years, have been built upon and
improved at private, not public expense, and have been subject to the
assessment of property taxes.
334
By its decision, the Rhode Island Supreme Court recognized
that the limits of state power need not extend beyond the boundary of
legitimate private property rights to protect the public's interest under
the public trust doctrine. In doing so, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court avoided the turmoil and trauma which has occurred in other
states in recent years. In Massachusetts and Mississippi, state law
was interpreted to vest title in filled tidal lands (Massachusetts) and
tidal waters (Mississippi) in the state under the public trust doctrine
rather than in the private owners who had occupied those properties
under a claim of ownership for generations.33 5 In Massachusetts
legislation was necessary to clear title to Boston's Back Bay,336 and
in Mississippi a special commission was established in the Secretary
of State's Office to lease back the lands at issue.
Rhode Island's balancing of public trust rights with private
property rights in filled tidal land is a model of how to reconcile these
potentially conflicting interests.
. See, e.g., Agreed Statement, supra note 288, at 5, 7: Greater Providence Chamber of'
Commerce, 657 A.2d at 1043-44.
.. See Cinque Bambini Partnership v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988).
"' See Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 393 N.E.2d 356 (Mass. 1979);
Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 424 N.E.2d 1092 (Mass. 1981).
.. See Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 59-1-17, 59-1-19, 59-1-21, 59-9-67 (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1996).
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